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Historically one of the institutions built into our system of
government by law and designed, presumably, to provide a vehicle for
public participation is the public hearing. I have not done the research
required to determine definitively when and where the public hearing
first appeared in its fullblown state, but its roots no doubt can be
traced back to preconstitutional times. The public hearing serves
different functions, and is subject to different legal constraints,
depending on the type of decision-making with which it is associated.
One type involves governmental decisions whose primary thrust is to
affect the public in a general sense, even though specific sub-groups
may be the subject of the decision. Examples are enactment of criminal
and tax statutes. This kind of decision-making, which we can call
legislative or rulemaking, uses the public hearing ostensibly as a fact
finding device, presumably to give the decision-maker information or
ideas about public attitudes and reactions. It is well established that the
procedures followed-including the kinds and extent of public
hearings-is largely if not entirely in the discretion of the decision-
maker. Few legal constraints exist. The procedures by which decisions
are reached, including the quantity and quality of information available
to the decision-maker, and motives hidden or otherwise, are essentially
nonreviewable. In other words, public participation is presumed to be
incorporated into the decision-making process by virtue of the
representative nature of the decision-maker; public participation finds
its outlet in the periodic election process rather than in formal hearings.
A second kind of governmental decision is the decision whose
primary thrust is to affect the rights or privileges of specific individuals
as a result of their individual status or actions. A familiar example is
the criminal or civil trial. This is the adjudicative process. It is looked
upon as being public only in the sense that the public has an interest in
insuring that governmental processes are meeting democratic standards.
Thus the proceedings are generally open to public view, but not to
public participation.
*Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
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A third kind of governmental decision-making, and the kind that is
of primary interest here, arises out of and is largely the product of
administrative activity. It has several characteristics that differentiate it
from the legislative and adjudicative kinds mentioned above. Perhaps
the most significant is that frequently both legislative and adjudicative
functions will be carried on at the same time by the same agency,
sometimes as part of the same decision-making process. Another
characteristic is that the decision-maker is frequently neither a
popularly chosen representative nor a neutral arbiter; it is usually the
agency's own rules or prior decisions which are being challenged. Still
another characteristic is the fact that the more common examples of
these "mixed" type of decisions occur in the urban planning-land use
regulation and development area. Public participation in the legislative-
type decisions of the agency is not assured through the representative
character of the decision-maker; and assurances of adequate
information inputs and impartiality in adjudication-type decisions are
not forthcoming merely through public scrutiny of the process. This
blending of function and role makes analysis of the public hearing
process in traditional terms difficult, and in many ways confusing.
Accordingly, an alternative analysis will be attempted.
Three Functions. The following discussion adapts in part an
approach used by Ashbel Gulliver in 1941 in an article on the statutory
formalities of gratuitious transfers.' An assumption will be made that
the public hearing requirement in the land use area is intended to, or at
least should be able to, perform one or more useful functions in the
governmental decision process-something beyond being simply an
historical formality. What might these functions be? In the first place,
the hearing requirement might serve to impress upon both the decision-
maker and the public the fact that the matter before the house was
something more than a preliminary inquiry or a proceeding of little or
no immediate significance. This function may be particularly useful in
the land use area, where planning commissions spend (theoretically at
least) considerable amounts of meeting time on long-range planning
matters, including the consideration and assimilation of substantial
quantities of data having no direct impact at the moment. While those
of us in planning would argue that all of this activity is important and
the citizens ideally should be interested and involved in all of it,
realistically it may be useful to have a technique for making visible the
'See Gulliver and Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 Yale L. J. I (194 1).
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difference between the immediately important and the more long range.
This may lead to a heightened public interest in a particular matter
under consideration, and a more careful and fuller participation in the
matter by the members of the planning commission and other affected
decision-makers. It may also contribute to the public's feeling of
participation in important matters. For convenience we can call this
function the RITUAL function.
A second function that may be considered evolves out of the use of
the hearing for fact finding. When the issue before a planning
commission or city council is a specific question of land use, such as a
zoning adjudication decision, the public hearing may provide the
decision-maker with both factual information and some insights into
public attitudes. The extent to which new inforiation is developed at
the public hearing depends of course on how well informed the planning
commission or council members were prior to the hearing. This in turn
depends on the quality of staff work, if any, and the practice of the
board with regard to the holding of briefing meetings prior to the
hearing. By the same token, the usefulness of the hearing as a means
for obtaining insights into public attitudes depends on what other
avenues of communication are open between decision-maker and
citizen, and the extent to which there is a pattern of general citizen
participation as distinct from special interest pleading in particular
matters.
If the issue before the planning commission or council is a more
general question of planning, such as the adoption of a comprehensive
plan, the complexities of planning technology and the multiplicity of
questions being dealt with at one time make useful informational
contributions from the general public less likely, unless a particular
individual or group goes to the trouble of obtaining his own
professionals. And the explication of public sentiment in this context
tends to degenerate into pro versus anti planning unless there happens
to be a particular detail of the plan that catches the public fancy. In
any event, this information and attitude gathering can be conveniently
referred to as the EVIDENTIARY function.
The third function that may be served by the public hearing in the
land use area has its analogy in the judicial process of adjudication.
Our fundamental notions of due process have long encompassed the
idea that the individual has the right to advance notice when his direct
interests are in jeopardy by contemplated governmental action, and the
idea that before action is taken he is entitled to be heard in his own
behalf.
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When statutes specifically provide for notice and hearing procedures,
the courts generally consider that compliance with the statutory
requirements is a prerequisite to valid governmental action. This is
particularly true in those cases directly affecting a specific individual or
a specific tract of land, such as condemnation and zoning
adjudications. When the statutes are not explicit, local practice varies
considerably, in part because the courts have generally not seen fit to
impose constraints. We can conveniently refer to this notion of a right
to be heard as the PROTECTIVE function.
1. THE RITUAL FUNCTION
Perhaps it is at the local level, in the smaller community, where the
importance of a visible ritual prior to making significant decisions is
most felt. Planning commissions tend to operate informally, indeed
with little concern for legal niceties (and sometimes with little regard
for democratic practices). But when the time comes for the commission
to hold "a public hearing," there is at least some awareness that there
are legal strictures governing the proceedings, and some sensitivity to
the fact that the members of the commission are now acting as
government officials with correlative responsibilities toward the
citizenry.
In the same way, a citizen's invitation to a public hearing "as
prescribed by law" may tend to impress upon him the fact that
something of importance is pending, and may set a tone of serious
consideration that can reduce the number of irrelevant (and irreverant)
participants.
One somewhat fortuitous outcome of the public hearings associated
with the adoption of a comprehensive city plan is that it affords an
opportunity for individuals and groups to obtain a forum for the
expression of views and thoughts about their city and its management.
Most citizens, even the more civic minded ones, are reluctant to ask for
a place on the agenda of the city council or even the planning
commission in order to state their feelings about the need for more
trees along the streets, or better road maintenance or street layouts.
Indeed, a grievance needs to become a major irritant before most
people will contact their alderman or commission member, much less
appear in person before the assembled board.
However, in several well-attended public hearings on a plan, in which
the writer has participated as a commission member or chairman, the
comments of the citizens typically covered a wide range of municipal
'See Gulliver and Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 Yale L. J. 1
(1941).
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problems and functions, generally related to the subject of the plan, but
by no means limited to its content. The catharsis for the citizen who
participates in such a session, as well as the insights received by the
commissioners, are values that should not be undersold. Perhaps it is a
pity that the opportunity for such a session seems to come at quite
infrequent times.
It was with some of this in mind that the Northeastern Illinois
Planning Commission (the regional agency for the Chicago
metropolitan area) set up and conducted a two year series of hearings
prior to adoption of its comprehensive plan. The Illinois legislature in
1957 created the Commission (originally the Northeastern Illinois
Metropolitan Area Planning Commission), and charged it with the
duty of establishing and adopting a comprehensive plan for the
development of the six county Chicago metropolitan area. The statute
provided that "Prior to the adoption of a comprehensive plan for the
development of the . . . area, the Commission shall hold a public
hearing thereon." 2 There were provisions for giving notice that a
hearing was to be held, and the Commission was enjoined to "give full
consideration to the evidence and opinions presented at the hearing.'' 3
In 1965 the Commission had reached a point in the development of
its regional plan where it wished to hold a series of meetings in various
communities for the purpose of explaining what it was doing and to
gather information about the responses to its work. The participants in
these meetings were to be interested citizens and civic leaders in the
communities concerned. Some were to be invited by special invitation,
most by newspaper and other general media announcement. The
commission was also concerned that it comply with the statutory
requirements regarding notice and hearing, and was in doubt as to at
what point "a hearing" should be held.
The writer was asked to serve as special counsel to the commission in
the planning and carrying out of what came to be known as the plan
review and acceptance project. Without going into great detail, it was
eventually agreed that, from the viewpoint of providing an orderly
structure for the meetings, and for the purpose of underlining the
importance of the work and the needs for active citizen participation,
each area meeting would be advertised and conducted as a "public
hearing," with all the appropriate trappings. Although a final report of
the project has not yet been completed by the commission, it is safe to
'Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 85 § 1130 (1967).
'Ibid. at § 1131.
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say that the project was strikingly successful in arousing public interest
and participation (including some open hostility), even though it is not
possible to say exactly what share of the credit can be given to the
"public hearing" strategy.
The strategy did have one unanticipated and troublesome
consequence. Some of the opponents of the commission and its work
seized on the fact that each area meeting was advertised as a public
hearing, pointed out that the law required only one public hearing, and
vociferously complained that the commission was therefore free after
the first area meeting to adopt a regional plan without further notice
or opportunity for public comment. The commission of course had no
such intention, and it is difficult to assess what if any political gain was
made by the argument. It did, however, cause some discomfiture
among the commission's staff, and illustrates one aspect of the problem
of trying to make a meaningful hearing process out of a perfunctory
statutory requirement.
2. THE EVIDENTIARY FUNCTION
As a fact gathering device the public hearing is probably not too
useful. Several reasons can be suggested. One is the ad hoc order of
citizen presentations at such hearings, to say nothing of the ad hoc
content. This is particularly true of a hearing on a broad issue, such as
adoption of a plan or an implementing ordinance. When the issue is a
narrower one, such as the rezoning of a specific tract of land, the
proponents and opponents may find it easier to deal in specifics, and
the fact content tends to run somewhat higher.
A second reason why the hearing may not produce useful fact inputs
is the timing. The statutes and ordinances rarely specify when the
public hearing is to be held, other than in general terms such as "prior
to the adoption of the plan [or ordinance] . . ." This leaves
considerable discretion in the decision-maker, and it is not unusual to
find that the hearing comes long after the fact-gathering process has
been completed, and after tentative (or sometimes more than tentative)
decisions have been made about content. This pattern is borne out by a
number of studies.'
The pattern of course is not universal. The multiple hearings project
undertaken by the Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission,
'See e.g., Plager and Handler, The Politics of Planning for Urban Redevelopment,
1966 Wis. L. Rev. 724, 773: "By the time the [four] projects were made 'public,' serious
debate and decision making had been foreclosed."
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described in the preceding section, was more than an effort to "sell" the
commission and its program. It was also a determined effort to elicit
information from citizens and officials throughout the area.
A few statutes have been drafted with the timing problem in mind,
suggesting that the hearings required by the statute are intended to
provide useful informational inputs. The 1947 Indiana zoning enabling
act provided that the plan commission in the course of preparing its
proposed zoning ordinance "shall hold public preliminary hearings and
conferences, at such times and places and upon such notice as it may
determine to be necessary to inform and aid itself in the preparation of
the tentative report.'" A similar provision appears in the West Virginia
act, enacted in 1959.6
Still a third reason why the public hearing may not prove useful for
fact gathering is the increasing prevalence of professional planning
assistance for the decision-maker. One of the chief jobs of the planning
staff is to gather the evidence concerning a particular issue, and present
it in a usable fashion to the decision-maker. Today this usually takes
the form of a written report distributed in advance of the public
hearing.
When there is no professional staff, or sometimes as a result of staff
oversight, an important area of input may be overlooked, and then the
public hearing may provide the opportunity for its introduction. On
several occasions the writer has attended public hearings on a proposal
where, during the course of the hearing, a spokesman for a state or
other governmental agency appeared for the purpose of providing
information not otherwise available with regard to the proposal. The
indication in several cases was that the agency had only learned of the
proposal a short while ago, sometimes through reading the newspaper.
The English Town and Country Planning Act avoids this mutually
embarrassing situation by specifically requiring, among others, that:
"(1) Before granting permission for development in any of the
following cases, whether unconditionally or subject to conditions,
a local planning authority shall consult with the following
authorities or persons, namely:-
"(a) where it appears to the local planning authority that
the development is likely to affect land in the area of any
neighboring local planning authority, with that authority;
"(b) where it appears to the local planning authority that
'Ind. Am. Stat. § 53-760 (1964).
"West Va. Code § 8-5-42 (1966).
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the development is likely to create or attract traffic which will
result in a material increase in the volume of traffic entering or
leaving a trunk road or using a level crossing over a railway, with
the Minister of Transport;
"(c) where the development involves the formation, laying
out or alteration of any means of access to a highway (other than
a trunk road) and the local highway authority concerned are not
the authority making the decision, with the local highway
authority concerned;
"(d) . . .
" (e) . " .
(f) in relation to land in a metropolitan borough, where the
development-
(i) would, whether in accordance with the development plan
or not, conflict materially with existing development in the
locality in which the land is situated, or
(ii) would conflict with proposals to construct or widen
streets notified to the local planning authority by that borough,
with the council of that borough." (1963 Act, § 1I.)
The consultation required by the Act presumably does not take place at
the public hearing on the proposals. This raises the question of how the
public participants at a hearing can become privy to information
previously made available to the decision- maker, in order to comment
upon or challenge the accuracy of the information. The question raises
complex problems and issues touching on a number of aspects of
governmental decision-making; it must necessarily be left for
exploration at another time.
During the preceding discussion, the emphasis has been on fact
gathering, as distinct from opinion gathering. If the public hearing is
looked upon as an opinion gathering device, many of the objections
raised above may not apply with the same force, if they apply at all.
For example, the point about the ad hoc nature of public responses at
the hearing is of considerably less significance if the object of the
presentation is to voice a preference for or against a particular
proposal. Similarly the presence or absence of professional staff
becomes unimportant. While the staff may include as part of its report
its understanding of public sentiment regarding the proposal, a
politically-minded decision-maker is not likely to prefer this to an
opportunity to hear from the people himself.
As to the timing issue, the reverse of the argument made becomes
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applicable. The proposal needs to be in fairly final form before it can
be fully grasped by those not involved in its preparation, and of course
the better the understanding of the proposal the more likely the opinions
expressed about it will reflect the speaker's values. This suggests the
public hearing should come shortly prior to final action, rather than in
the earlier formative stages.
It is a matter of some speculation as to how significant is the
expression of public opinion on matters of the kind we have been
discussing, particularly if the opinion is substantially divided on the
issue. On the other hand, students of politics will point out that
sometimes the presence of a determined group of objectors, even though
relatively small, may stall or completely reverse an otherwise
committed project. This point will be commented upon again in the
next section.
3. THE PROTECTIVE FUNCTION
To the extent the public hearing is part of a primarily adjudicatory
proceeding, such as a zoning proceeding involving the classification of a
particular tract of land, the hearing provides an opportunity to the land
owner to appear and be heard in open forum before decision is
rendered. This is a fundamental protection for the property owner, and
the statutes presumably state what constitutional doctrine would
otherwise require. A recent Illinois case is illustrative:
"Illinois courts have held that the statutory provisions for the
publication of notice in connection with the amendment of zoning
ordinances are within the confines of procedural due process..."
"We regard the petition which seeks rezoning, or the proposed
ordinance or resolution of amendment, as the procedure whereby
the proposed change in the existing zoning is initiated. Section 5
[of the County Zoning Act, IRS c. 34, § 3158] makes specific
provision for a hearing preliminary to the amendment of a zoning
classification and requires notice to all interested parties. Such
requirement is for the protection of the property owners and is
essential to the exercise of jurisdiction by the County, or its
agencies, over the land described in the notice. We believe such
notice to be mandatory and jurisdictional. Any amendment passed
in contravention thereof is void." 7
'Village of Riverwoods v. County or Lake, 237 N.E.2d 547, 551 (2d Dist. App. Ct.
1968).
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Exactly what is sufficient opportunity to meet minimum due process
standards is not clear. It is one thing to have an opportunity to be
heard; it is another to require that one be listened to. It is clear,
however, that the former must precede the latter; the rule goes at least
that far.
Nor is it clear who must hear. The statutes in zoning and similar
regulatory matters frequently provide that there must be a hearing
before the planning commission prior to its reporting of the matter to
the local legislature, and the local legislature must hold another hearing
prior to its rendering the decision. The second hearing tends to be a
replay of the first, and the actors sometimes show signs of over-
rehearsal. Some statutes simply require a hearing, without indicating
whether it is to be before the legislature, the planning commission, or
both. Local practice varies, but is rarely challenged, except perhaps as
additional smoke in an otherwise murky law suit.
The protection, whether real or theoretical, afforded by the public
hearing may run only to the land owner, but may also run to his
affected neighbors. There has been more than one instance when a land
use proposal was defeated less on the merits than on the strength of an
organized and vocal group of objectors at the hearing. In one particular
instance the vocal group-some 250 strong-was organized in part
through the efforts of a member of the planning commission itself. He
opposed a proposal pending before the board, and feared that without a
strong display of public opposition he would not have enough votes to
block it. His strategy worked.
The success of this technique has been documented in several studies.
In a study of the Lexington Zoning Board of Adjustment, it was found
that during the period studied the board granted 63% of the petitions
where there were protestants, compared with 85% granted where there
was no protestants. Where neighbors favored the petition or said they
had no objection provided certain conditions were met, the board
granted 91% of the petitions.' Even more striking results came out of a
Philadelphia study, where it was found that the board of adjustment
granted only 23.9% of variances requested when protestants appeared,
compared with 78.7% when there were no protestants.9
When the hearing is one not involving the right of specific
individuals, but is one on a more general question such as adoption of
'See Dukeminier and Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case Study in
Misrule, 50 Kty L.J., 273, 328 (1962).
9See Note, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 516, 542 (1955).
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a comprehensive plan, the protective function seems to recede if not
disappear. The hearing process would appear to be more analogous to
hearings on legislative-type matters, and due process requirements
presumably would be minimal if not nonexistent. But perhaps this
conclusion should not be reached too hastily. At the local level a
"general" issue may in fact affect a relatively small number of people.
To deny them any right to be heard on the basis of a
legislative/adjudicative dichotomy, particularly in view of the evidence
of success of some group protests, may be to deny a significant
opportunity for public participation.
CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis is intended to illustrate some of the
complexities involved in using the public hearing as an institutional
device for citizen participation in governmental decision-making.
Hopefully it also suggests that the device may lend itself in some
situations to effective use for that purpose.
There are of course other alternatives for structuring public
participation. Community workshops are being tried, and may have
considerable promise for specific areas. Advisory committees,
representative of a cross section of affected residents, have become a
requirement for a number of federally sponsored urban programs. It
would seem apparent that the greater number of institutional techniques
available through which public participation can be channeled the
greater will be the impact of the citizen in the decision making process.
If this is so, then the public hearing process, with its historical roots
and with some evidence of its having performed useful functions in the
past, deserves a careful reexamination to see if it can be made more
useful, and better employed.

